analysis, this boils down to the question of what the optimal degree of competition is for promoting dynamic efficiency (in the sense of maximising the long term rate of growth of industrial and overall productivity). We answer this question here with respect to the experience of the outstandingly successful East Asian countries -Japan and South Korea. In view of the extraordinary long term economic achievements of these nations in the post-war period (Singh, 1993a) , this experience is important in its own right and for the lessons which other emerging economies may draw from it.
The subject is also controversial. In their seminal analysis of industrial organisation in Japan, Caves and Uekusa (1976) were stringent in their criticism of the Japanese competition policy.
They concluded that "Its (anti-monopoly policy) failures have placed significant costs on the Japanese economy in the form of allocative inefficiency and diversion of rivalry into costly non-priced forms. We cannot detect any compensating gains." (p.157). On the other hand, Michael Porter (1990a) in his influential recent work on the competitive advantage of nations has argued that the international competitive success of the Japanese companies derives in large measure from the intense rivalry and competition they face in their domestic markets. "Nowhere", he writes, "is the role of fierce rivalry more apparent than in Japan . . ." [Porter, 1990b, p82] .
The importance of strict competition policy in a more general context has been stressed by the World Bank in its recent advocacy of a "market friendly" approach to development. (World Bank 1991).
The Bank observes:"Competitive markets are the best way yet found for efficiently organising the production and distribution of goods and services. Domestic and external competition provides the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and technological progress". 1 Until relatively recently, the traditional economic theory's answer to the question of optimal degree of competition was simple: maximum competition. As Telser (1987) notes: "It is hard for many economists to accept the proposition that competition may be excessive because the received theory regards competition as always good, the more there is the better".
Although earlier contributions by Schumpeter (1942) and Richardson (1965) World Bank(1991), page 1. This assertion is highly controversial (see Singh,1993b) , not least of all because the East Asian evidence, as we shall see later, does not support it.
2 For reviews of the new industrial organisation literature see Jacquemin(1987) , Schmalensee and Willig (1989) , Tirole (1990) ; for international trade, see Helpman and Krugman (1989 The economic failings of the highly monopolised and closed centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union do not suggest that the other extreme of almost zero competition and almost zero openness has much to recommend it either.
In this context the competition policy record of the exemplar East Asian economies which have purposefully desisted from either extreme, as we shall see below, assume special significance.
In what follows, for reasons of space, we concentrate more on domestic rather than foreign competition although we refer to the latter where appropriate.
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For similar reasons, we also confine our attention to product markets, and do not discuss the factor markets. Moreover, we consider here the Japanese experience only during 1950 -1973, the period of Japan's most rapid growth and the one which is most relevant from the standpoint of the emerging nations (See further Singh, 1989) .
II

Antitrust and Guided Competition in Japan
The Japanese inherited their antitrust laws from the U.S.
occupation authorities after World War II. These were robust pro -competition measures modelled on the U.S. pattern and based on U.S. philosophical conceptions. In the immediate post-war period, the laws were strictly enforced and were successful in dismantling the leading pre-war zaibatsu -the large industrial groups which had dominated the Japanese inter-war economy -and were in the U.S.
eyes responsible for the Japanese war preparations. However, soon afterwards, under the pressure of the cold war, a rapid erosion of the competition laws, both defacto and dejure, started to occur.
This included interalia the re-groupment, with government encouragement, of the old zaibatsu into somewhat looser groupings, the keiretsu.
As Caves and Uekusa note, these antitrust laws had no domestic constituency in Japan at the time. More importantly, apart from being imposed by alien occupation authorities, they were also apparently alien to the basic economic philosophy of the Japanese ruling circles. Okimoto (1989) (pp.12-13).
In short to promote investment and technical change, instead of permitting unfettered competition, the Japanese government has controlled and guided domestic competition in a purposeful manner.
Competition has both been encouraged, but notably also restricted in a number of ways. This has been particularly true during the years of rapid growth, 1950 -1973. The agency primarily responsible for the antitrust enforcement in Japan is the Fair Trade
Commission. However, in the Japanese scheme of government, it has much less power compared with MITI which is responsible for the country's industrial policy.
Although the FTC has never been entirely toothless and antitrust-enforcement in Japan is not a totally meaningless charade, most scholars agree that in any conflict between the two agencies' objectives (e.g. over the promotion of large scale firms or price fixing arrangements during a business cycle downturn), it is MITI and its industrial policy which by and large have prevailed over the FTC and the competition policy.
To illustrate, it is useful to reflect on some of the blatant anti-competitive actions were often re-enforced through MITI's use of "administrative guidance" to firms and its discreet directions to industry associations with whom it invariably had close links.
However, these restraints on competition are only a part of the story. An equally significant part is MITI's strong encouragement of vigorous domestic oligopolistic rivalry and international competitiveness. In general, whether competition was promoted or restricted depended on the industry and its life-cycle:
in young industries, during the developmental phase, the government discouraged competition; when these industries became technologically mature, competition was allowed to flourish.
Later, when industries are in competitive decline, the government again discourages competition and attempts to bring about an orderly rationalization of the industry (Okimoto, 1990 ).
Yamamura ( has a relatively closed economy, the volume of imported manufactured goods in the late 1970s was proportionally almost twice as large as in Japan. (Singh,1993b) .
Protection, together with restrictions on domestic competition, provided the Japanese companies with a captive home market leading to high profits which enabled them to undertake high 4 To illustrate, Japan's machine tool industry was given selective tariff protection specifically for those machine tools with potentially high income elasticities of demand and high productivity growth rates. But machine tool builders benefiting from protection were required to produce at least 50% of their output in the form of computer numerically controlled machine tools by a certain date (Amsden and Hikino,1993) . rates of investment, to improve the quality of their products, and also to capture markets abroad. The latter was of particular importance to Japanese firms, since in return for protection, MITI often imposed on them export and world market share performance targets. Companies recognized that to move forward, to have access to foreign technology, licenses etc., they had to export. The emphasis on exports and on maintaining oligopolistic rivalryinstead of concentrating resources and subsidies on a single "national champion", which many governments in their industrial policies are prone to do -are the key factors which distinguish Japanese policies from those of other dirigiste countries.
At the empirical level, there is an apparent paradox in the operations of the Japanese industrial and competition policies during the high growth period.
Although MITI fostered oligopolistic rivalry and investment races among large firms, as seen earlier, it was also responsible for weakening Japan's anti-monopoly laws. Nevertheless, as measured by conventional industry concentration ratios, competition increased, i.e., concentration ratios generally declined. to economic growth, the Japanese experience suggests reverse causality; that it was growth which stimulated competition, at least in the sense of reducing industrial concentration, rather than the other way round.
7 5 There are two forces at work here -births of new firms and the relative rates of growth of small and large firms. If large firms grow at a faster rate than small firms, the effect of this maybe greater than that of new entry, and thus increase concentration. See further Hughes and Singh(1980) . See also the discussion of the Korean case in the next section. 6 Some economists suggest that the Japanese miracle would have occurred without the industrial policy. For a systematic critique of this view, see Boltho (1985) . Similarly, others argue that MITI's competition policy measures to attain dynamic efficiency created serious economic imbalances in the affected industries. For a critical analysis of this argument, see Okimoto (1989). 7 This is not to suggest that the Japanese growth was entirely due to MITI's policies -many other factors were also significant. Similarly, Uekusa (1977) has argued that the occupation authorities deconcentration measures would also have helped increase new entry of firms.
Moreover, lower industrial concentration does not necessarily imply reduced monopoly power 
III Product Market Competition in South Korea
Whereas rapid growth in Japan was accompanied by declining industrial concentration (until the mid-1960s), the relationship between the two variables in South Korea was less straight-forward (in the high growth period [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] . Korea grew rapidly to be sure, and anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that competition among Korea's large and diversified business groups was also fierce.
But growth was not accompanied by declining concentration at either the industry or aggregate levels due to the pattern of industrial of dominant firms, or an increase in consumer welfare in the sense of traditional welfare economics. Hughes and Singh (1980) . expansion: "Korea's growth in value added is due first to expansion of existing firms, second to entry of offspring firms, and only to a minor extent to net entrance of new entrepreneurs" (Jones and Sakong, 1980, p.176) .
The output of the top 5 and 10 business groups grew much faster than GDP, so that aggregate economic concentration rose spectacularly (Kim, 1987) . Korea's all-industry average 3-firm concentration ratio remained higher than Japan's ---62% compared with 56.3% respectively (in the early 1980s). Between 1970 and 1982 the share of total manufacturing shipments produced under a competitive market structure decreased from roughly 40% to 30%, while the share produced by oligopolies increased from 35% to 50% (Lee, et. al., 1986) . generous subsidies to establish a general trading company by meeting government performance standards regarding minimum export volume and number of export products (Cho, 1987) .
The importance of state discipline over big business was appreciated by Korean President Park Chung Hee, along with his keen appreciation (some would say to a fault) of the central role of big business in catching up. He wrote: "One of the essential characteristics of a modern economy is its strong tendency towards centralization. Mammoth enterprise--considered indispensable, at the moment, to our country--plays not only a decisive role in the economic development and elevation of living standards, but further, brings about changes in the structure of society and the economy... Therefore, the key problems facing a free economic policy are coordination and supervisory guidance, by the state, of mammoth economic strength" (1962 ( , pp.228-229, as cited in Amsden, 1994 .
Even more so than in Japan, therefore, growth and competition in Korea were characterised by "administrative guidance". (1992, p.45) .
IV Conclusion
The analysis of this paper demonstrates that industrial policy has dominated competition policy both in Japan and South Korea.
The central objective of competition policy in these economies has been dynamic rather than static efficiency. Instead of maximum competition, these countries have therefore deliberately restricted it in many directions in order to increase their investment rate and to accelerate their technological development.
However, competition, but not of the traditional textbook variety, has also been encouraged in important ways: both Japan and Korea have fostered intense oligopolistic rivalry in individual industries among competing conglomerates.
The paper shows that during much of the high growth period in Japan, despite all the government restrictions on competition, industrial concentration actually fell. This was due to the fact that investment and output rose rapidly, leading to sizeable new entry and fast growth of small firms. Thus in contrast to the conventional paradigm in economic development, it was growth which led to increased competition and reduced concentration, rather than the other way around. Moreover, contrary to this paradigm, it is certainly arguable that without the government control of competition and monitoring of investment "races", such high growth rates may not have materialized in the first place.
It has also been suggested here that the practical experience of these countries in guiding competition, in creating a highly successful combination of co-operation and competition, can be rationalised in terms of the recent new developments in the theory of industrial organisation and international trade. On the face of it, the East Asian experience would also appear to be consonant with the vision of "plausible capitalism" in Schumpeter (1942) , where large oligopolistic corporations are the main vehicles of technological progress. However, this is only true as far as it goes, since an essential feature of East Asian development has been the crucial role of the government in controlling the competitive process, setting performance standards and implementing other industrial policy measures. There is no such industrial policy role for the government in "plausible capitalism". 10
